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Summary
Norway lacks a comprehensive strategy for engaging in 
fragile states in general, as well as a whole-of-govern ment 
strategy for any particular country, including Afghani-
stan. This policy brief recommends that Norway should 
consider adopting a law, or high-level policy document, 
that make it a requirement for Norway to have a nation-
al whole-of-government policy towards every country 
where it is engaged in initiatives related to peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding or conflict resolution.
Such Norwegian whole-of-government strategies should 
be limited to the higher strategic level. This will provide 
space for operational and tactical flexibility so that the 
Nor wegian government can pursue coherence with local 
and international strategic frameworks, while also remain-
ing flexible to changes in the situation on the ground. 
In order to address the negative effects a Norwegian 
whole-of-government approach might have on the spe-
cial relationship between the Norwegian government 
and Norwegian civil society, the report recommends that 
a forum be established where Norwegian civil society and 
government can regularly engage each other on issues 
related to the country’s international engagements, and 
its whole-of-government approach. 
There is a significant fissure between policy commit-
ments to an integrated or comprehensive approach, and 
the challenges of navigating the real-world dilemmas 
that decision-makers face when trying to coordinate 
multiple independent agencies. Despite the significant 
policy-level initiatives undertaken internationally, and in 
Norway, to facilitate an integrated or comprehensive ap-
proach, this coherence dilemma remains characteristic – 
not only of Norway’s engagements – but indeed of most 
peace, stability and reconstruction operations today. 
Introduction
This policy brief is based on the NUPI-report Norway’s 
Whole-of-Government Approach and its Engage ment 
with Afghanistan which represents a first attempt at 
comprehensively analyzing the Norwegi an whole-of-
government approach, as well as assessing its effec-
tiveness to date. The policy brief will summarize the 
report and its findings.
The rationale for a national whole-of-government ap-
proach is greater effectiveness. It is driven by the as-
sumption that a government’s foreign engagements 
will have a more meaningful and sustainable impact 
when the various government departments involved 
pursue a common strategy, have a shared understand-
ing of the problem, a common theory of change, and 
an agreed plan for implementing such a strategy. 
There is broad consensus, both internationally and in 
Norway, that peace and stability operations are man-
aged more effectively when the interdependency and 
interconnectedness of the political, security, govern-
ance and development dimensions of these operations 
are recognized. Various models have been developed, 
including the Integrated Approach and Integrated Mis-
sions concepts by the United Nations, the Comprehen-
sive Approach by the European Union and NATO, the 
Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) among 
NATO member states, including the United States, 
and a range of Whole-of-Government approaches, of 
which the best known is probably the original Cana-
dian 3D (Diplomacy, Development and Defence) con-
cept.
Norway has been a prominent supporter of the UN’s 
Integrated Approach and has actively contributed 
to the development of NATO’s Comprehensive Ap-
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proach. Little has been written to date, however, about 
Norway’s own whole-of-government approach, and 
this study was aimed at filling that gap. 
In the next sections of this policy brief we would there-
fore like to use the opportunity to address three ma-
jor challenges for Norway’s future engagement with 
fragile states; (i) developing a comprehensive strategy 
and a whole-of-government strategy for fragile states 
(ii) the ad hoc nature of the Norwegian approach, and 
(iii) Tension between strategic and operational coher-
ence. Each of the identified challenges is followed by 
recommendations on how they could be addressed by 
the government. 
Lack of Strategic Policy Planning
Despite the leading role Norway has played in promot-
ing integrated approaches to international peacekeep-
ing and peacebuilding missions, Norway does not 
have a comprehensive strategy for its engagement in 
fragile states in general, nor a whole-of-government 
strategy for any particular country, including Afghani-
stan. However, in 2005 Norway initiated the Afghani-
stan Forum as an attempt to establish a Norwegian 
whole-of-government approach, and in 2009 Norway 
did attempt to develop a strategic vision for its engage-
ment in Faryab province. The Faryab strategy lacks a 
description of the ground realities that the strategy is 
intended to deal with, and is more a vision than a plan 
– but it can offer a good starting point. It is indicative 
of how a more strategic approach to Afghanistan can 
help to direct a more coherent whole-of-government 
approach to Afghanistan, as well as other similar 
country initiatives. Government agencies will find it 
difficult to pursue coherence if they do not have clear 
benchmarks for measuring whether they are acting in 
coherence with a larger strategy.
The reluctance to develop such specific strategies is 
perhaps symptomatic of Norwegian foreign policy in 
general. There is no doubt about Norway’s commit-
ment to make a meaningful and sustainable contri-
bution, but in the absence of a coherent whole-of-
government strategy the default foreign policy and 
whole-of-government approach often appears to hinge 
on being recognized as a leading and exemplary lib-
eral peacebuilding, humanitarian and development 
actor. The lack of a clear strategic planning process 
has resulted in government agencies and bureaucrats 
to often pursuing the safe fall-back, or auto-pilot, posi-
tion: namely to make Norway look good. 
Promoting Norway’s image on the one hand and pur-
suing Norway’s ability to make a meaningful and sus-
tainable solution on the other, is not necessarily two 
contradictory policy approaches. However, pursuing 
the one does not necessarily result in the other and 
both require a coherent and interlinked strategy. 
Most of the examples provided throughout the report 
contribute to this finding, but perhaps the most obvi-
ous one relates to the contribution of the Ministry of 
Justice in Afghanistan. The limited number of police 
officers that Norway can deploy in Afghanistan – ap-
proximately 23 in 2009 – have been spread thinly 
across a broad variety of organizations and projects. 
Nine officers are serving with the EU mission (EUP-
OL-A), four are working within the US-led Focus Dis-
trict Development Programme, one is seconded to the 
UN mission (UNAMA) and seven officers were work-
ing bilaterally on various projects, amongst others, 
mentoring the Counter Narcotics Police in Afghani-
stan and the Female Police Project at the Police Acad-
emy. This broad distribution of the police contribution 
ensures that Norway is seen to be a partner in a wide 
range of international police initiatives, and may thus 
contribute to achieving the objective of furthering 
Norway’s image as an exemplary and prolific partner 
in international operations. 
Recommendation:
An alternative approach could be to focus these Nor-
wegian resources on one, or a few, limited specific 
needs-based programmes, so that the investment 
could more readily produce tangible and sustainable 
results. 
Process vs. Structure
One strength of the Norwegian whole-of-government 
approach lies in its ad hoc nature that favours pro-
cess rather than structure. This avoids the main un-
intended consequences of most of the institutional 
models, such as the Canadian START, the US C/SCRS 
and the UK’s Stabilization Unit. In most, if not all, 
these cases, the newly established coordination units 
became part of the coordination problem and bureau-
cratic turf battles, competing for funds, power, influ-
ence and prestige with the existing departments that 
they are supposed to coordinate. The Norwegian ap-
proach, which is to keep coordination separate from 
execution, seems to be optimal for the highly complex 
and dynamic environments in which most peace and 
stability-type interventions take place.
However, too much of an ad hoc nature can be a weak-
ness. Norway’s whole-of-government approach seems 
to be too dependent on the will of the government of 
the day, the goodwill of the current state secretaries 
and the personal chemistry of the personnel in the 
embassy in Kabul and the PRT in Meymaneh. In this 
context the Swedish, Dutch and Canadian models, 
where there is a legal, or high-level policy basis for the 
3whole-of-government approach, are to be commend-
ed, because it serves to formalize the processes that 
need to be followed to ensure that a whole-of- govern-
ment approach has been integrated into the policy de-
cisions that lead to, and sustain, foreign interventions. 
Recommendation:
Apart from a national policy on a generic whole-of-
government policy making process in Norway, there is 
also room for a specific whole-of-government strategy 
for each country, region or conflict system, e.g. piracy 
of the Somali coastal region, where Norway chooses to 
intervene. The goals and objectives of such a strategy 
should be broadly defined at the higher strategic level, 
leaving room for operational and tactical flexibility. In-
deed, part of the strategy should be to remain flexible, 
and to seek to be coherent with national and interna-
tional strategic frameworks, as well as to be responsive 
to changes in the situation. In that way, the strategy 
would not become locked into a narrowly defined and 
highly detailed national whole-of-government plan, 
but would be able to consider Norway’s goals and ob-
jectives in the context of the dynamic situation as well 
as national and international strategic frameworks.
Canada, the UK and others use their whole-of-gov-
ernment approaches to coordinate all their interna-
tional interventions. By contrast, Norway’s approach 
has been limited to the intervention in Afghanistan. 
The Norwegian whole-of-government approach could 
be formalized, either in a law, or through a high-level 
policy process, and could be applied to all cases where 
the Norwegian government deployments civilians, po-
lice and military to international conflict management 
operations. 
The Tension between Strategic and Operational 
Coherence
The need for strategic guidance at the political level in 
Oslo has been recognized and implemented, through 
the functioning of the Afghanistan Forum at the state-
secretary level, but there seems insufficient recogni-
tion of the need for operational-level coordination in 
Kabul. Head office political functionaries and officials 
typically cover a range of issues at the more strategic 
level, whereas the officials deployed into the theatre of 
operations have a directed focus on the specific case 
and end to be more engaged in the operational and 
tactical issues at hand. As this is also the case with 
other countries and international organizations, the 
coordination among international actors in the thea-
tre or at the operational level is a crucial level where 
those dedicated to the specific context can meaning-
fully engage with each other. It is here that the local 
authorities are present at the highest level, and that 
they can be most meaningfully engaged. It is thus very 
useful to have a range of in-country level coordina-
tion processes where national, international and local 
stakeholders can meet regularly to share information 
and coordinate action. 
Recommendation:
It is recommended that Norway, following the Canadi-
an example, include as part of its whole-of-government 
approach a specific set of policy actions required at the 
operational or country level. These could include an 
annual national or operational-level action plan, with 
an assessment, an operational action plan, a descrip-
tion of coordination mechanisms, and a monitoring 
and evaluation plan. Neither the Norwegian strategy 
or operational plan, nor the monitoring and evaluation 
process, should be so intensive as to hinder or pre vent 
the country-level representatives from partici pating 
fully in their own functional coordination pro cesses. 
The whole-of-government coordination process 
should be intensive enough to inform the Norwegian 
policy-making process in a meaningful way, but not so 
intensive that it negatively affects Norway’s ability to 
engage meaningfully with other international partners 
or in-country and local-level coordination pro cesses.
Relationship with Norwegian Civil Society
Norway’s special relationship with civil society has 
several advantages for its whole-of-government ap-
proach. First, it can provide the country with flexibility 
to adapt relatively easily to a changing situation; sec-
ond, it enables maximizing the range of engagement 
so that Norway can be involved in a wide range of in-
ternational processes; third, it can serve as a way for 
the government to maintain the humanitarian space 
– as in Afghanistan.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and all the agencies 
involved in the whole-of-government approach, should 
engage with the Norwegian NGO and research com-
munity, and openly discuss the Norwegian whole-of-
government approach, and how that may impact on the 
special relationship between the Norwegian govern-
ment and civil society. 
Recommendation:
A forum could be established where Norwegian civil 
society, recognized as a key partner in achieving Nor-
way’s foreign policy, especially its developmental and 
humanitarian objectives, can regularly engage with 
each other on issues related to Norway’s international 
operations and its whole-of-government approach to 
these. 
Such a forum could be replicated at the embassy level, 
so that the Norwegian Ambassador and other govern-
ment agencies represented at the incountry level may 
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regularly engage with Norwegian NGOs active in that 
country, and discuss issues of common concern. Such 
organized discussions can create the space for a posi-
tively critical analysis of Norway’s foreign policy and 
whole-of-government approach in general, or in a par-
ticular country. They can provide both the Norwegian 
government and Norwegian civil society with useful 
information about each other’s policies, actions and 
perspectives – offering to both an opportunity to har-
monize and align their policies accordingly.
Conclusion 
We have found that Norway lacks a comprehensive 
strategy for engaging in fragile states in general, as 
well as a whole-of-government strategy for any parti-
cular country, including Afghanistan. 
On the basis of our findings we recommend that Nor-
way consider adopting a law, or high-level policy docu-
ment, that make it a requirement for Norway to have 
a national whole-of-government policy towards every 
country where it is engaged in initiatives related to 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding or conflict resolution.
Furthermore we recommend that such Norwegian 
whole-of-government strategies be limited to the 
higher strategic level. This will provide space for op-
erational and tactical flexibility so that the Norwegian 
government can pursue coherence with local and in-
ternational strategic frameworks, while also remain-
ing flexible to changes in the situation on the ground. 
We are concerned about the negative effects a Norwe-
gian whole-of-government approach might have on 
the special relationship between the Norwegian gov-
ernment and Norwegian civil society. To address this 
concern we recommend that a forum be established 
where Norwegian civil society and government can 
regularly engage each other on issues related to the 
country’s international engagements, and its whole-
of-government approach. 
